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The official online space for the Complex Processes Research Group (CPRG), Swinburne University, Melbourne, Australia

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    Dear members of the complex processes research group, The next meeting of the complex processes on the theme of history will feature: SPEAKER: Dr Michael Dix TITLE: Fake history of philosophy: a case study TIME: 12.30pm, Wednesday, 19th September VENUE: ATC205 Abstract: The ontology of Heraclitus, the first western philosopher of process, has been much misinterpreted for two and a half millennia. A consideration of how such misunderstanding arose and persisted reveals a tradition of “Whiggish” history in philosophy—a history biased toward the worldview and culture of “the winners” as if assuming this to be history’s “goal”—in this case, a history that systematically obscures and misunderstands the philosophical tradition of process philosophy, dialectical metaphysics and dialectical reason. The case-study of my title is John Burnet’s Early Greek Philosophy (1930) in which Burnet’s commitment to an analytical substance-and-property ontology aligned with modern scientific materialism impairs his understanding of contrary traditions and blinds him even to the contrary evidence of Heraclitus’ own words. A corollary of the fake history of process philosophy is systemic failure to understand Heraclitean and later process-philosophy postulation of a dialectical metaphysics of emergence. By bringing these systemic misunderstandings to light, this case-study reveals the difficulties involved in communicating an emergentist philosophy of process to a culture based in fundamentally different metaphysical assumptions—whether they be those of Athenian Hellenism, Enlightenment humanism, or today’s scientific materialism.
  3. That clarifies things for me - thanks Matt. And for me it does speak to the idea that explaining things as "pure chance" is as religious[1] a thought as explaining it in terms of a divine intelligence or otherwise purposive power. Which isn't to say it's wrong, but just equally indeterminate. Others (I have Schelling in mind here) would say that we need to depart from the domain of science altogether in order to explain the "how," which is the tenor of even his earlier "idealist" philosophy and certainly the explicit theme of his thinking from 1809 onward, where art/the aesthetic takes the place of science in terms of "explaining" how things come into being naturally. The new place given to intuition as a pathway to absolute knowledge gives the experiencing consciousness an important role to play here - I'm not sure if this is getting too far off topic though, since it leads us into the ways in which psychology "infiltrates" theoretical observation. Footnotes ^ By "religious" I don't mean anything like denominational religious paradigms, but rather any idea or belief which is projected on to an indeterminate Being in an attempt to explain that Being, but which will always remain undecided.
  4. Thanks Gord, In relation to probability, lets consider the vase scenario - let us say that there is a small probability that a vase might occur naturally. Then let us consider that we actually find one- ok, so maybe it happened naturally, and perhaps it was bound to happen - so can we explain how it happened? We should be able to. Otherwise there may be other explanations (eg. it came on meteor or was send by a previous rocket (i.e maybe it wasn't a natural accident). The trouble with our knowledge of the theory of life is that we can say it might happen naturally with a small probability, we then say it did happen, as we have life, but we still cannot explain HOW it happened, thus we are missing an essential part of the picture. Which means we don't really know how it happened (thus even the probability that it could remains an assumption). But current theory seems content to accept just two elements of this: there was a probability it might happen naturally, it is there, so it did happen naturally (but we cannot explain how). The theory rests on the hope that science will find an explanation. I say that until it does, there is a question about whether science ever can explain this as a pure chance event. Does that help?
  5. @Matt, many thanks for posting this thread. I'll somewhat naively jump in here (perhaps somewhat naively, having unfortunately missed the talk): Does complexity dictate probability? Does this not assume that we can on some level measure what we call "chance"? I see the logic of your critique of this theory, but this also makes me think of what I remember as one of Zeno's Paradoxes (someone please correct me if I'm wrong). The version I can recollect is: proceeding in a straight line from point A to point B, each step of the movement sees its distance reduced by half. Do you ever get from point A to point B? For me, that resonates with the question of time here. Is time finite? If it's infinite, then does the emergence of "any number of less complex things" remain as undecided as whether or not one gets to point B? @CPRG
  6. Hi Arran and Others, Thanks for raising and discussing the mystery of the laws of physics at the creation of the universe in the seminar yesterday and the relationship to theories such as String theory. But I think the creation of life, and also the emergence of human life are equally great mysteries that are glossed over with similar scientific stories. Arran talked about there being trillions of stars that have existed for billions of years. The presence of such large numbers – which boggle the mind – are not sufficient in themselves as an explanation for life and its evolution, yet these large numbers are relied on to fill in gaps in theory. For example, imagine you were walking on the surface of Mars, or any other of the trillions of stars, and you came across something that looked exactly like a painted Greek vase (see below). Now, you would no doubt be astounded. Yet, the mathematical theoretician will explain that this is really quite simple. There is a very small probability that such a vase will occur by chance in Nature, and that given long enough the emergence of such a vase is therefore inevitable. You, however, might still be somewhat amazed at this freak of nature. Now, if you are astounded at finding a vase - the like of which can be made by many a skilled craftsman - how much more astounded should you be at coming across life, which no scientist can create from the raw materials of nature in a lab, let alone in the 'wild'? Life is much more complex than (and thus more unlikely to occur by chance) than a vase. Yet, the same explanation applies: there is a small probability that life could occur by chance, and therefore given enough time it will surely emerge. This theory implies that any number of less complex things should then also emerge - given enough time. Finding a Taj Mahal on one of these planets should then be no real surprise. In fact, according this logic we should not be surprised if - in our travels - we find lying in the desert of some lifeless planet identical similes of Eiffel Towers, London Bridges, World Trade Centers etc. No doubt you are starting to find this concept a bit absurd. Yet even the simplest form of life is vastly more complex (and more fragile) than all these things, and therefore is less probable. Not only is life highly improbable, but given you have some microbial-like life, it is also highly improbable that - in a relatively short space of time - like a few billion years - it will evolve into a fish-like creature, then there is another improbability that it will evolve into a rat-like creature, then another improbability that it will evolve into an ape-like creature, and then another improbability that it will evolve into a human. These things which we assume can occur in nature by chance we cannot do ourselves. I mentioned the lack of success computer scientists – and mathematicians such as Conway – have had in replicating the processes of life and evolution. We cannot create life, we cannot reproduce the processes of evolution that take something simple and evolve something complex, yet we create stories that are as almost as fanciful as Meta-verses and String theory and seem satisfied with such. Now I am not suggesting that the story of evolution is completely wrong, but only that it is incomplete, and that in the absence of proof (which is lacking as many of the processes have not been replicated either in reality or simulation) further explanation is required to make aspects of it convincing. Regards, Matt Greetings Comrades, One must be careful bout infinites. The set of positive integers (1,2,3,4 etc.) is infinite, but it does not contain the number 0.5, let alone an apple. An infinite set of possibilities does not mean anything can happen. If an item is contained in an infinite set, for example “all the things that can happen within the laws of physics in an infinite amount of time”, but the sampling is finite, such as the time from the big bang, only some things that are possible have happened, and an infinite number of things have not. Even in this infinite “not happened yet” set, the possibilities are bounded by the laws of physics, so some things just cannot happen. Thus, a spontaneous Airbus A380 may happen, just as a Boltzmann Brain can, but the time since the big bang has been so short, and the entropy clock is running so fast, that they will take a long, long, long, long, time to approach anything like a smidgeon of a chance. Life can happen, the question is whether or not the chances have been tilted by some catalyst… Zoltan Hi Matt, I don't think Gare's point was to suggest that because we have trillions of starts and billions of galaxies it is no surprise that we have life. And I don't know if it is fair to suggest that we are more likely to find a Greek vase, the Taj Mahal etc. in the universe than life because these are themselves products of human thought and human relations and, because they embody, reflect and maintain these relations, they do reflect the growing complexity of the universe. These things are not merely random collections of mass but reflect both the desire to give form to thought and while they are clearly no in themselves more complex than life, much is lost by considering them separate from the conditions which gave rise to them. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, they reflecting the human desire for meaning, a desire which is crumbling under the weight of the physical view of reality which considers consciousness and life as epiphenomenon in order to maintain the core and necessary assumptions mainly, that the universe looks like Newton thought it did at some level and is therefore calculable by ever growing forms of mathematics, which exist so far disconnected from reality that it cannot be translated into no mathematical language. Consciousness and life cannot be explained through their view of reality. String theory, as Gerard point out, is a tautology (much like simple addition 1 + 1 is the same as 2) because it requires a multiverse in order for the pyramid to stand, it requires the 2 for the 1 to make sense. Gare's point is that there is no evidence for the existence of multiverses and we do not need them to make sense of things. So rather than try and squeeze something else into an obviously faulty framework, why not do what philosophy has always done and speculate about the nature of man's role in the universe while appreciating the complexity of this historical moment? Gare's view is that we act in relation to stories and that stories legitimate the act - we achieve recognition by acting in such a way that reflects mutual interpretation of a situation from a different perspectives. And while these stories are not our own, they become part of us through socialisation. But this is also the case for scientists. Thus, we exists and embody multiple stories, from the global to the local, over vastly different temporal levels, many of which we may not be aware of. And because our stories (which are not really told thanks largely to scientific materialism and postmodernism as Aaron and Arran pointed out) hold conflicting and sometimes defective assumptions about what humans are, assumptions that give the impression that humans do not need stories and do not need meaning, these story exists in tension which play out in society. The horror of neo-liberalism is that it has effectively legitimated the story of humans as vile creatures, unable to constrain themselves, unable to act for the common good and unable strive for anything more than the most base of things. This story has become the basis for achieving recognition, which through distraction, consumption and competition destroys the possibility of reflection, question and replacing defective assumptions. Despite this, we are confronted with a concrete world in which these assumptions clearly do not reflect the complexity of things. Rather then reflect on these contradictions and reformulate its own assumptions, physics has for the most part retreated into abstractions and accepted its apolitical existence. But Gare believes that, by underpinning the sciences with a natural philosophy which presupposes this complexity, reform can spread through all the branches of knowledge and repair itself much like imagining how a tree might prune its own branches. And it is these views which are starting to dominate science, but they need a new story to bring it all together. You might find the book I have attached useful in understanding this. Ryan Thanks Zolton, Yes, but in relation to “have been tilted by some catalyst…” - that is the missing piece. What separates complex life from less complex structures of other forms.? That said, I admit my examples were a bit facetious but I think the general point remains. What we need to know is: What substances are needed to be combined to create the elements of life? (perhaps we have made good progress on this) Under what conditions can they come into existence and be combined to create the necessary components for creating a lifeform? (some progress on this – but in lab conditions, not ‘natural’) This is the big one: how are they then all put together in such a way that a living, consuming, reproducing being comes into existence.? That is the huge jump, which I think is not so remote from conceiving a jumbo jet suddenly coming together from all the parts lying around (so far we have only put some of the parts there, and only in lab conditions). No one has done this, or I suspect even knows how to approach this problem – especially in relation to occurring in a dynamic, perhaps damaging – natural environment. A scientific associate of mine, no friend of religion or spurious theories, has stated that even producing life in a lab would not answer some of the questions – until you can explain how it occurs in nature. Thus, this remains a mystery. Cheers, Also Peter Kreeft discusses pretty much this same issue:
  7. 1 download

    My 2 May talk on Schelling's Naturphilosophie. Please note: this is a draft copy only. Please do not cite this document without permission.


  8. Hello @CPRG, Welcome to the CPRG forums! This is where most of the talking and discussion goes on. A few tips: Click Follow in interesting topics/threads to be kept up to date on replies and new posts. To quote a post in your reply simply click Quote. If you want to quote a specific passage from a post, simply hold down your mouse button and select the text you want to quote - a "Quote this" button will appear. Click it to insert your chosen text into your reply. You can drag and drop images into posts and replies - they will appear at the present cursor location. To reference a specific person in your post, use the at-sign (@) followed by their name, e.g., @Gord Barentsen. Doing this will send the person in question a notification (private message or email, depending on their settings) that they've been mentioned. To address everyone in the CPRG in your post, click the Group Mentions button beneath your reply window and select CPRG. This will insert a reference to the CPRG where your cursor is and everyone in the CPRG with notifications enabled will be notified of this entry. Hint: do this at the very beginning or end of your post, or work it into your prose. That's it for now. Any questions, just ask!
  9. Dear members of the complex processes research group, The next meeting of the group on the theme of saving the environment from neoliberalism will feature: SPEAKER: Cristina Neesham, Swinburne Business School TOPIC: Adam Smith and the Modern Business School TIME: 12.30pm, Wednesday, 23rd May VENUE: AGSE301 Abstract: This presentation focuses on how business schools have adopted and applied the economic and moral-philosophical ideas of Adam Smith, and on the implications of these distortions for business education today. Using examples of genealogical studies (such as, the history of Marx’s concept of necessary class conflict as derived from Smith’s theory of social order), I critique the still dominant myth that neoliberalism (especially as reflected in the work of free-market theorists such as Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman) is a natural ‘offspring’ of Smith’s economic thought. More specifically, I argue that, when similar assumptions about the ‘mechanics’ of the market are combined with profoundly different theories of social order, human nature, and the social meaning of value (as derived from economic activity), this results in profoundly different, and not similar, economic theories. Having mapped the trajectory of several Smithian ideas from his time to ours, I conclude that Smith’s work has more in common with Marx (especially in his early writings), with Sen (and his direction of development economics) and with social psychologists such as Jonathan Haidt than with von Hayek and Friedman. Based on this conclusion, I propose a manifesto for a new business education curriculum, aimed at deconstructing the narrow ideological co-optations operated by neoliberalist doctrines and at recovering the richness of Smith’s economic and moral-philosophical thought to support new, different understandings of socially responsible business activity.

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